RECENT CASES by unknown
RECENT CASES
RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY-GROUNDS.-IN RE
-O'SULLIVAN, io7 N. Y. SUPP. 462.-Held, an attorney who received from a
woman $3oo to obtain the release of her husband from prison, agreeing
to return $250 if he did not secure the pardon, and thereafter failing to
secure the release, did not return the money, but appropriated it to his own
use, was guilty of misconduct requiring his disbarment. Laughlin, J., dis-
senting.
An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court, admitted under its rules,
and is liable to be disbarred for dishonorable conduct or any single criminal
act, as may show that trust and confidence cannot be reposed in him as such.
Percy's Case, 36 N. Y. 651. And if he does not conduct himself with fidelity
to his clients, the court is not only warranted, but required, to disbar him,
Strout, Petitioner, v. Proctor, 71 Me. 288. So where an attorney neglects
and refuses to pay over money due to his client, after demand, this will be
such a breach of professional duty as to require disbarment. People ex rel.
Hungate v. Cole, 84 Ill. 327; Wilson v. Pophain, 9I Ky. 327. But where an
act is merely discreditable, the court will not take judicial notice of it and
disbar him. Dicken's Case, 67 Pa. i69. Or where acts sufficient for disbar-
ment have been committed, but the proof fails to disclose any bad motive for
the commission thereof, either from the act itself or from the circumstances,
disbarment is not authorized, The State ex rel. Fowler v. Finley, 30 Fla. 325.
CARRIERS--CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOcK-LIABILITY.-TEx. CENT. P_ CO. v.
G. W. HUNTER & CO., 104 S. W. 1075 (TEx.).-Held, a carrier of live stock
is not an insurer against loss, except that due to an act of God, the public en-
emy, or the inherent qualities of the goods shipped, as in the case of inanimate
freight; but the distinction is made that a carrier of live stock is further re-
lieved from liability, in the absence of negligence, for loss due to the natural
propensities and habits of the stock.
Carriers of animals are common carriers, subject to the same responsi-
bilities as carriers of other classes of property. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Harris,
67 Tex. I66; Myrick v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 1o7 U. S. 102. But L. S. & M. S.
R. Co. v. Perkins, 25 Mich. 329, holds that railroad companies are not by the
common law, common carriers of live stock and can only make themselves
such by assuming to convey as common carriers; while Railroad Co. v.
Hedges, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 645, intimates that carriers of live stock are not
insurers in any respect, but holds that the mere proof of an injury establishes
a prima facie case. But the better rule seems to be that the common law lia-
bility of a common carrier to deliver live stock is not different from that
where the delivery of merchandise is concerned. St. L. & S. E. R. Co. v.
Dorman, 72 Ill. 504; Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355. And so a railroad is
bound, at common law, as a common carrier, to receive and transport live
animals as other property, and is liable, after receiving them as insurer
against loss from any cause, except the act of God, the public enemy, or the
inherent character or vicious propensities of the animals themselves. G. C. &
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S. F. Ry. Co. v. Trawick, 68 Tex. 314; The Ga. R. R. v. Spears, 66 Ga. 485.
Thus, where the cause of the damage, for which recovery is sought, is not
connected with the inherent nature or vicious propensities of the animals
undertaken to be carried, the carrier is liable. McCoy v. The K. & D. M. R.
Co., 44 Iowa, 424; Lindsley v. M. & St. P. R. Co., 36 Minn. 539. And further,
the onus is on the carrier to account for the stock delivered to it and lost
during transit, without affirmative proof of negligence by the shipper, except
in the case of special contracts. McBeath v. Wab. St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 20
Mo. App. 445-
CARRIERS-PASSENGERS' BAGGAGE-CARRIERS AS WAREHOUSEMEN.-KRES-
SIN V. CENTRAL RY. Co., 1o3 N. Y. Surpp. 002.-Held, that where baggage is
carried on the train with the passenger so that he is present upon its arrival,
he must take it away as soon as practical; and if, for his own convenience, he
chooses to leave it with the carrier, the latter becomes a warehouseman.
It is a general rule that when a passenger fails to claim his baggage
within a reasonable time after the arrival at its destination, the extraordinary
liability of the carrier is changed to that of an ordinary bailee for hire.
Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Addizoat, 17 Ill. App. 632. A "reasonable time"
within the meaning of this rule depends upon what is the usual course of
business at the place where the baggage arrives, the customs of the company,
the manner of transporting baggage from the station, and all the circum-
stances surrounding the case. Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 6o5; Mote v.
Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 27 Iowa 22. It has been held in a number of
cases that it is the duty of the passenger to present his check and receive his
baggage immediately upon its arrival, making due allowance for delay caused
by the crowaed state of the depot at the time. K. C. F. S. & M. P. Co. v.
McGahey, 63 Kan. 344; G. H. & San Antonio R. R. Co. v. Smith, 81 Fexas,
479. And it seems that a passenger cannot extend the strict and rigid liabil-
ity of a common carrier as an insurer by postponing the time of taking pos-
session of baggage for his own convenience, or on account of peculiar cir-
cumstances. Chicago, R. L & P. R. Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill. 510; Steamboat v.
Smart, iO7 Pa. 492. If the baggage is sent on ahead to be held until the
arrival of the next train, or is held on request until the passenger can con-
veniently send for it, the carrier holds it merely as a warehouseman. Laf-
fray v. Grummond, 74 Mich. i86; Ga. Ry. & Banking Co. v. Thompson, 86
Ga. 327. However, the carrier must perform its duty to the passenger, and
it is not discharged from liability as an insurer until the baggage has been
put in a proper place, ready for delivery, and the passenger has been given
a reasonable opportunity, under the existing circumstances, to claim it.
Dininny v. PN. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 546; Toledo, St. Louis & K. C.
R. Co. v. Tapp, 6 Ind. App. 304.
CARRIERS-PERSONAL INJuRIEs-AsSAULTS BY EMPLOYEEs.-ZEccARDI V.
YONKERS R. Co., 83 N. E. 31 (N. Y.).-Plaintiff was a passenger on defend-
ant's car. The conductor quarreled with another passenger and ejected him,
whereupon he and the conductor engaged in a fight upon the ground, the
car being stopped at the time. Plaintiff, not knowing what the fight was
about, stepped betwcen to separate them, when the motorman assaulted him.
Held: defendant owed him no duty. Chase and Hiscock, J.J., dissenting.
The law implies a contract upon the part of a carrier of passengers for
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the protection of the party carried from the insults and wanton utterances ofstrangers, fellow-passengers, the carrier and its servants. Winnegar v. Cen-tral Passenger Railway Co., 85 N. Y. 547. And the best considered cases
hold that the carrier is liable even for torts committed outside the scopeof servant's authority. Bryant v. Rich, io6 Mass. i8o; Indianapolis N. R.
Co. v. Cooper, 6 Ind. App. 2o2; White z. Railroad Co., 115 N. C. 631; God-dard v. G. T. R. Co., 57 Me. 2o2. The difficulty arises in determining when
the relation has ceased; in Central Railway Co. v. Peacock, 6g Md. 257,when the passenger started to go to the office of the carrier while the horses
of the car were being changed, the relation was held to have ceased, and inState v. Grand T. R. Co., 58 Me. 176, where the train was stopped on a side-track, the passenger surrendered his rights as such when he got off the car.
But the majority of cases seem to take the contra view, saying that the rail-road company owes a peculiar duty to its passengers for hire. Atchison, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Shean, 18 Colo. 368. And it is not necessary that a person
should be on the train in order to be regarded as a passenger. He has theright to stand or walk around. J. M. & I. R. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind.
568. If the actual transit has been interrupted for the time being, the rela-tion continues, even though the passenger leave the car. Conroy v. C., etc.,
R. R. Co., 96 Wis. 243. So if he leaves at a regular station from motives ofeither business or curiosity. Chicago, R. L & P. R. R. Co. v. Sattler, 64
Neb. 636. So if he leave to eat his meals in a nearby hotel. Watson v.
Oxanna Land Co., 92 Ala. 320.
CONTRACT-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LIABILITY FOR EXPENSES.-ARGUS
Co. v. HorcHxzss ET AL., 107 N. Y. Supp. 138.-Held, an attorney's negotia-
tion for work to be done in a law suit is the act of an agent for a knownprincipal, and for the expenses thereof he does not become personally liable.
Chester and Cochrane, J.J., dissenting.
There has been great divergency in the holdings of the courts upon therelationship of attorney and client. An attorney at law has authority by
virtue of his employment, to do in behalf of his client all acts, in and out
of court, necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of thesuit Moulton v. Bawker, I15 Mass. 36. A person is included by the acts
and omissions of his attorneys where no fraud or unfairness appears.
Lawson v. Bettison, 12 Ark. 401; State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321. Therefore
the demands of the attorney are those of the client, when they pertain tothe progress of the case. Lee v. Buckheit, 46 Wis. 246. And he is not liable
for acts performed in good faith. Campbell v. Brown, et al., Fed. Cases, 2355.
While, in Sims v. Brown, 6 Thompson & Cook 5, the relation between attor-
ney and client was said to be the same as principal and agent, and the
authority of the attorney extends only to the control and prosecution of the
case. Ratican v. Union Depot Co., 8o Mo. App. 528. Therefore, when anattorney borrowed money in order to pay court expenses, so as to save his
client's rights, the attorney was liable for the debt. Bell z. Mason, io Vt. 509.
And in Trimmer v. Thomson, 41 S. C. 125, a case analogous to above case, itwas held that when an attorney procured printing to be done in a case, he ispersonally responsible to the printer for the work so done, unless he shows
that he was contracting as agent for his client.
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CRIMINAL LAw-JuwsDcTioN OF OFFENsE-LocALITY OF OFFENSE.-
COMMONWEALTH v. BALL ET AL., 104 S. W. 325 (Ky.) .- Held, where deceased
was shot in one state, and died in another state, the crime was committed
in the state where the shooting occurred, and the courts of that state have
jurisdiction.
Homicide is committed in the state where the felonious act occurs,
although death takes place in another state. U. S. v. Guiteau, io Fed. 161;
State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548. So, where a mortal blow is struck in a United
States fort and death occurs in the state outside the fort, the state has no
jurisdiction over the homicide. State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331. But there is
a contrary view, for homicide is only completed when death occurs. U. S. v.
Bladen, Fed. Cas. No. 14,605; Commonwealth v. Linton, 2 Va. Cas. 205.
And a statute giving the state authority to convict a citizen of another
state or country for homicide, where the injured party died within the state,
the injuries having been inflicted upon the high seas or in another state, is
constitutional. Commonwealth v. Macloon, io Mass. I. But a statute is
also valid which declares that prosecution may be maintained in a state where
the fatal blow has been struck, although death occurs elsewhere. Green v.
State, 66 Ala. 40. And, where one stands in one state and shoots a person in
another state, the murder is committed in the latter state and its courts alone
have jurisdiction of the offense. State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 969.
DAMAGES-MEASURE-DESTRUCTION OF GROWING CROPS.-BERARD ET AL.
v. ATCHISON & N. R. Co. ET AL., 113 N. W. 537 (NFB.).-Held, the measure
of damages for the destruction of a growing crop is the value of the crop
at the time of its destruction.
The measure of damages for the destruction of a growing crop is the
value of the crop in the condition it was in at the time of the injury. Colo.
Con. L. &. W. Co. v. Hartman, 5 Colo. App. I5o; Richardson v. Northrup,
66 Barb. (N. Y.) 85. For a growing crop has an approximate value, at
every stage of its growth, and the measure of damages is the value of the
crop at the time of its destruction with lawful interest from that time to
the present. Clarke v. Banks, 6 Houst. (Del.) 584; Ry. Co. v. Lyman, 57
Ark. 512. And, in estimating the value of growing crops destroyed, it is
proper to take into consideration the fact that the land was very fertile and
productive, and that it had for a number of years produced better crops, and
they had brought better prices than the average. Economy Light & Power
Co. v. Cutting, 49 Ill. App. 422. But, in Shotwell v. Dodge, 8 Wash. 337,
in an action for damages for the loss of a hop crop, the measure of dam-
ages is said to be the market value of the crop alleged to be lost, over the cost
of producing, harvesting and marketing. And the measure of damages is the
market value of the crop at the time of its injury, less the fitting of it for mar-
ket, and diminished by whatever the value of the portion saved, if any, may
be. Smith v. C. C. & D. R. R. Co., 38 Ia. 518. But evidence of what the
value of a crop would have been if it had matured is of too speculative a
character to form a proper basis for damages. L & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Benitos,
59 Tex. 326.
DIVORE-REvIEW-EFFEcT OF DEATH OF SUCCESSFUL PARTY.-CHATTER-
TON ET AL. V. CHATTERTON, 83 N. E. 161 (ILL.).-Held, that a husband against
whom a decree of divorce was granted at the suit of the wife, may, after the
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death of the wife, sue out a writ of error to review the decree, though
it does not appear from the record that the wife left property in which the
surviving husband will take an interest on the decree being reversed.
There is a conflict in the holdings of the court upon this subject. An
action to procure a judgment of divorce is a purely personal one, and cannot
survive the death of either party, and a court is deprived of the power to
review. Kirschner v. Dietrich, i1O Cal. 502. Such death operates to abate
the action. Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa 189. A motion to set aside a
decree after death of one of the parties will be denied, Watson v. Watson,
i Hun. 267. But a separate action in the nature of a bill of revivor may
be brought, which will bring all the heirs and interested persons in to
defend. Groh v. Groh, 171 N. Y. Supp. 985; Zoellner v. Zoellner, 46 Mich.
511. But there must be sufficient grounds for granting a new trial. Roberts
v. Roberts, i9 P_ I. 349. While in Israel v. Arthur, 8 Colo. 85, it was held
that a decree could be reviewed on a writ of error, whether property
rights are affected or not. Boyd's Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 24i. But it will
not lie against anyone but him who was a party or privy to the first
judgment. Wren v. Morse et al. 7 Ill. 72. And when a court once acquires
full jurisdiction, during the life-time of both parties, the death of one after
trial will not abate the suit; it is but an irregularity. Danforth v. Danforth,
118 Ill. 236.
DYING DECLARATIONs-ADMIssmILrrY.-STATE v. HOOD, 59 S. E. 971
(W. VA.).-Held, that it is no ground for excluding a dying declara-
tion that it does not appear that the declarant does not believe in God, and
rewards and punishments after death.
The first reported case of a dying declaration being admitted as evidence
was in 1722, in Rex v. Reason, I Strange 499. Common law was that one who
does not believe in the existence of a Supreme Being who will punish false
swearing in a future world is incompetent, and consequently, dying declara-
tions would not be admissible. i Greenleaf Ev. Sec. 157; State v. Ah Lee, 8
Ore. 218. But many states hold that this rule has been abrogated, People v.
Sanford, 43 Cal. 29, and that a situation so solemn and so awful as impending
death is considered by law as creating an obligation equal to that imposed
by an oath, Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636, but the use of profane language imme-
diately preceding the statement is hardly to be reconciled with such an
assumption. Tracy v. People, 97 Ill. ior. And a disregard of the law of God
in his outpourings of blasphemy should surely affect the credibility of the
declaration when admitted. Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238. Some cases go fur-
ther and say no reliance whatever should be placed on them, State v. Elliott,
45 Iowa 486, and the extreme ruling is that non-belief in God renders them
inadmissible, but the law will presume such belief until contrary is proved,
Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463.
EASEMENTS-EXTENT OF RIGHT-BuRDEN OF PRooF.-ATTERBURY V.
McCLURE, 104 S. W. 958 (KY.).-Held, that the long and uninterrupted use
of a roadway across the land of the defendant casts upon him the burden
of showing that it was merely permissive.
It is a well-established rule that the mere permissive use of the land
of another for any length of time will not ripen into a prescriptive right and
may be prohibited or discontinued at the pleasure of the owner. Hagerle v.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Beebe, 123 Iowa 620; Belser v. Moore, 73 Ark. 296. But it is held that the
use of a way for the statutory period, unexplained, raises the presumption
that it is used under a claim or assertion of right, and not by permission,
and casts upon the owner of the soil the burden of showing that it is merely
permissive. Hammon v. Zehner, 23 Barb. 473; Clement v. Battee, 65 N. J. L.
674. Pavey v. Vance, 56 Ohio St. 162. Some courts have held that
the use of land, whenever one sees fit and without asking leave, is an adverse
use. However, the use of a way without objection or hindrance is not
inconsistent with its use by permission. It must appear that the use was
enjoyed under such circumstances as to indicate that it was claimed as a
right and not regarded by the parties as a mere privilege revocable at the
pleasure of the owner of the soil. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. V. Ives, 202 Ill. 71;
Conyers v. Scott, 94 Ky. 123.
FALSE IMPRiSONMENT-ARREST ON CRIMINAL CHARGE-DAMAGES-ELE-
MENTS OF COMPENSATION.-CLARK v. TILTON, 68 ATL. 335 (N. H.).-Held,
that the measure of damages would be the amount which would compensate
plaintiff for the injury he had sustained because of the arrest, and not such
damages as resulted to him by the suppression of the criminal prosecution.
It seems that the courts have been far from uniform in allowing the
expenses incurred in the prosecution of cases of torts to be recovered as
damages. Bank v. Williams, 62 Kan. 431; Wilson v. Town of Granby,
47 Conn. 59. In general, the principle which seems to guide the
courts in this regard is the distinction drawn as to the malice or negligence
of the act complained of. Clark v. Wolfe, 115 Ga. 320; Eatman v. Railroad
Co., 35 La. Ann. loi8. In actions for false imprisonment, however, the
courts have allowed counsel's fee and costs necessarily incurred because of the
false imprisonment to be considered with other expenses in the jury's esti-
mate of damages, even though no bad faith or litigious conduct on the part
of the plaintiff appears. Stewart v. Kimball, 43 Mich. 443; Parsons v. Har-
per, 16 Gratt. 64. And as a general rule it is held that the measure of dam-
ages in these cases is the actual expense incurred. Duggan v. B. & 0. R. R.,
i59 Pa. St. 248; Woodfolk v. Sweeper, 2 Humphr. 88.
GARNISHMENT-SUMMONS--WHEN ISSUED.-WEBSTER MFG. CO. V. PEN-
ROD, 114 N. W. 257 (MINN.).-Held, that a garnishee summons is issued
when delivered by the plaintiff or his attorney to the proper officer for
service upon the garnishee, and when the writ is sent to the officer by mail,
delivery is not completed until received by him.
In those states in which the issuing of the writ is the commencement of
the action, "issuing" is generally construed to mean the delivery of the writ
to the sheriff with the intent to have it served. Wilkins v. Worthen, 62 Ark.
4O. And a writ is said to be "delivered" within the meaning of this rule
when it is placed in the hands of the proper officer or deposited in a place
designated or provided by the officer for that purpose, or put in the course
of delivery. Mich. Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 130 U. S. 693; Webster v. Sharpe,
116 N. C. 466. So, as it is held in some states that when a letter is placed
in the post-office it passes out of control of the sender and into that of the
person to whom it is addressed, Taylor v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 9 How.
390, by analogy, the writ is deemed by some courts to be delivered to the
officer when it is mailed, addressed to him. Burdich v. Green, 18 Johns. 14.
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However, the delivery of the writ will not constitute the commencement of
the action unless there is a bona fide intention at the time of delivery of hav-
ing it served. Burnell v. Babbitt, 65 N. H. 168; [Vest v. Engle, IoI Ala. 509.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SALES WITHOUT LICENSE-EVIDENCE.-STATE V.
BROWN, 102 S. W. 394 (ARK.).-On trial for selling liquor without a license,
a witness testified that he asked the accused to sell him some whiskey; that
the accused replied that he could not sell, but that he would loan him some;
that the accused let the witness have two bottles of whiskey; that nothing
was said as to when the same was to be returned or paid for; that about an
hour and a half later, the witness returned and asked the accused what it
cost to get whiskey there, and gave the accused that sum, and told him that
when he made an order for whiskey, to get the witness some, and keep that
in place of what he had got. Held, a sale as a matter of law. Battle, J.,
dissenting.
A sale implies a transfer of property for money. And, as a general rule,
when a statute refers in terms to contracts of sale, it has no application to
contracts of exchange. Massey v. State, 74 Ind. 368. And, while under the
code of some states a "loan" would be as between the parties a "sale" as
distinguished from a mere bailment, it would not be a sale within the mean-
ing of a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor without license,
which, because of its being penal in its nature, must be strictly construed.
Skinner v. State, 97 Ga. 69o. These courts, however, will not countenance
an attempted evasion of a statute, and it is generally for the jury to deter-
mine whether there was a sale or a bona fide exchange. Robinson v. State,
59 Ark. 341; Coker v. State, 91 Ala. 92. But there are many courts that hold
that the intention of the legislature to inhibit the sale of liquor, in the broad-
est sense of that term, includes barter and exchange. Keaton v. State, 36
Tex. Cr. 259; Sparks v. State, 99 S. W. 546. It is said that practically there
is no difference between the terms. And to make such a refinement the
turning-point of the interpretation of a statute, contrary to the plain
intent of the legislature, would be a violation of all sound rules of construc-
tion. Howard v. Hanis, 8 Allen 297. It has been held that a loan is a sale
and this was without any limitation. Tombeaugh v. State, 98 S. W. 1054
(Tex.); Keaton v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 259.
JUDGMENTS-VACATING--MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.-BRANDT v. LITTLE, 91
PAc. 765 (WAsH.).-Held, that where an independent action is brought to
vacate a judgment as obtained without jurisdiction, a showing that the defend-
ant has, or at the time of judgment had a defense, is none the less necessary
because the judgment may have been so obtained, especially if the lack of
jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the record.
It seems to be the general rule in this country that a Court of Equity
will not set aside a judgment, void for want of jurisdiction of the court ren-
dering it, unless the party asking it has, or presents, a meritorious defense.
Meyer v. Wilson, 166 Ind. 651; White v. Crow, io U. S. 183. However, it
has been held in a number of states that a judgment rendered against a person
who has not been served with process and by a court which has no jurisdic-
tion over the parties is absolutely void, and that it is not incumbent upon the
plaintiff, seeking to restrain its enforcement, to allege and prove a valid
defense to the cause of action. Mosher v. McDonald & Co., 128 Iowa 7o;
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Blakeslee v. Murphy, 44 Conn. 188. But equity will not interfere to enforce
a mere technical right. Gregory v. Ford, 14 Cal. 138; State v. Hill, 5o Ark.
458. And it has been held that, although the judgment is void for want of
service on the defendant, a Court of Equity will not relieve until it is averred
and proved that if the relief is granted, a result would be attained different
from that reached by the judgment complained of. Colson v. Leitch, iio Ill.
App. 509; Hockaday v. Tones, 8 Okla. 156.
LEASE-COVENANT AGAINST ASSIGNMENTS-BREACH.-HERZIG v. BLUMEN-
KROHN, 1O7 N. Y. SuM. 57o.-A lease to B. contained a covenant against
assignments without the lessor's written consent, and reserved to the lessor
the right to re-enter for breach thereof. Before the commencement of the
lessee's term, and without the lessor's consent, the lessee leased the same
premises to defendant C. for the same term at the same rent by a lease which,
except for the date and names of the parties, was a precise copy of the orig-
inal lease. Held, that such second lease, though containing a covenant that
the lessee should surrender on the last day of the term, and reserving to B.
the right of re-entry for condition broken, constituted an assignment of the
original lease, and not a sub-lease, and was therefore a breach of the cove-
nant against assignment in the original lease. Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Originally a reversion in the primary lessee of some fragment of his
estate was needful to support a sub-lease, though it might be a day, Crusoe
v. Bugby, 3 Wilson 234, an hour, or even a minute, Poutney v. Holmes, i
Strange 404, but this rule is at present extended, and a reservation in the
first lessee of a right of entry for breach of covenant brings about the same
result, Stewart v. Long Islapd R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 6oi, being based on an
early English case, Doe v. Bateman, 2 Barn. & Ald. i68, but there is an appar-
ent conflict in New York itself, Bedford v. Terhune, 3o N. Y. 454. This lat-
ter view is based on the reversionary interest retained by- the lessee, Col-
lamer v. Kelly, 12 Iowa 319; that is, that a contingent reversionary interest
to be availed by an entry for breach of condition is sufficient to change the
character of an apparent assignment to a sub-lessee, Dunlap v. Ballard, 131
Mass. i61, but this principle is apparently predicated on statutory grounds,
for it is contrary to common law, for such was not a reversion nor an estate,
but a mere chose in action, Southard v. Central R. R. Co., 26 N. J. L. 21, and
could not be aliened or assigned or pass by grant of reversion, 2 Washburn
Real Prop. 451; Hoyt v. Ketchaln, 54 Conn. 6o; and the modern view, irre-
spective of statute, follows the main case, Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co.,
129 Ill. 318.
MASTER AND SERVANT-AcTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-OTHER
EMPLOYMENT AS A GROUND FOR REDUCTION OF DAMAGEs.-BEISSEL v. VERMIL-
LION FARMERS' ELEVATOR Co., 113 N. W. 575 (MINN.).-Held, where the
employee is wrongfully discharged prior to the termination of his contract
of employment, in an action to recover the stipulated wages for the entire
term covered by the contract, the employee is not required to allege and
prove that in the interim he was unable to obtain other employment.
Where a servant is discharged before the expiration of his term of
service, and endeavors, but is unable to obtain other employment, the meas-
ure of damages is the sum fixed by the contract of such unexpired term.
Southwick v. Bernhard, i7 N. Y. Supp. 478. And, while a party is bound
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to use reasonable diligence in obtaining other employment, he is not bound
to accept employment of a substantially different character. Hinchcliffe et al.
v. Koontz, 121 Ind. 422. But if he does accept employment of a different
character, the wages received may be shown in mitigation of damages for the
wrongful discharge. Stevens v. Crane, 37 Mo. 487. And, in mitigation of
damages, where an employee, discharged before the expiration of his term
of service, brings an action for wrongful discharge, and the defense in part
is that he received compensation in other employmentg during the unexpired
portion of the term, the burden of showing such compensation and the value
thereof is upon the employer. World's Columbian Exposition v. Richards
57 Ill. App. 6oi.. And though a servant is bound to use reasonable efforts
to obtain employment elsewhere, the burden of showing that, by reasonable
efforts, he might have obtained such employment is upon the employer.
Emery et al. v. Steckel, 12 Pa. State, 171; Barker v. Knickerbocker Life Ins.
Co., 24 Wis. 630.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-MAINTENANCE OF POLICE STATION.-WMIcOX V.
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 82 N. E. (N. Y.) iii9.Where a city exercises a gov-
ernmental function in maintaining a police station, used in part as a jail for
prisoners, as well as in part for the accommodation of its police force, held,
that it is not liable for the negligence of an employee in charge of an ele-
vator therein.
A municipal corporation exercises two classes of functions, private and
governmental, Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, this distinction being
clearly defined and well recognized, Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill 531, but in the
application lies the conflict. When the duty enjoined relates to some act in
the doing of which the city has some special interest apart from the public
generally, Merrifleld v. Worcester, iio Mass. 216, it is the English rule,
Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, etc., ii H. L. Cases 685, as well as the American,
that the municipal corporation is liable for an injury sustained, Briegle v.
Philadelphia, 135 Pa. St. 45r, but when the duty relates to acts which, in
their nature, are for the benefit of the public, Finch v. Board, 30 Ohio St.
37, and the city is representative and agent of the public, it is not liable, Hill
v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; this latter view was also held by Chief
Justice Marshall in Fonle v. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398. And the duty and func-
tion of keeping, Brown v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, and maintaining a city
prison is purely such a governmental act, Gray v. Griffin, III Ga. 361, and a
police officer is generally regarded as a public officer, Craig v. Charleston,
iSo Ill. 154; Vaughtman v. Waterloo, 14 Ind. App. 649.
